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Abstract
Direct reciprocity relies on repeated encounters between the same two individuals. Here
we examine the evolution of cooperation under direct reciprocity in dynamically structured
populations. Individuals occupy the vertices of a graph, undergoing repeated interactions
with their partners via the edges of the graph. Unlike the traditional approach to evolution-
ary game theory, where individuals meet at random and have no control over the frequency
or duration of interactions, we consider a model in which individuals differ in the rate
at which they seek new interactions. Moreover, once a link between two individuals has
formed, the productivity of this link is evaluated. Links can be broken off at different rates.
Whenever the active dynamics of links is sufﬁciently fast, population structure leads to a
simple transformation of the payoff matrix, effectively changing the game under considera-
tion,andhencepavingthewayforreciprocatorstodominatedefectors.Wederiveanalytical
conditions for evolutionary stability.
Key words: Evolutionary Game Theory, Structured Populations, Coevolution,
Dynamically Structured Populations
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Game theoretic ideas were ﬁrst introduced to biology by Hamilton (1964) and
Trivers (1971), but the ﬁeld of evolutionary game theory was founded by Maynard
Smith and Price (1973) and Maynard Smith (1982). The replicator equation (Taylor
and Jonker, 1978; Hofbauer et al., 1979; Zeeman, 1980) constitutes the mathemat-
ical foundation of evolutionary game dynamics. It is a system of ordinary differ-
ential equations describing how the relative abundances (frequencies) of strategies
change over time as a consequence of frequency dependent selection. The payoff
from the game is interpreted as biological ﬁtness. Individuals reproduce propor-
tional to their ﬁtness. Reproduction can be genetic or cultural. The expected payoff
of an individual is a linear function of the frequencies of all strategies; the coefﬁ-
cients of this function are the entries of the payoff matrix. For detailed reviews of
the replicator equation and other approaches to evolutionary game dynamics, see
Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), Weibull (1995), Samuelson (1997), Hofbauer and
Sigmund (1998, 2003), Gintis (2000), Bowles (2003), Cressman (2003), Nowak
and Sigmund (2004) and Nowak (2006a).
The act of cooperation typically involves a cost c to the provider and a beneﬁt b
to the recipient. In the absence of a speciﬁc mechanism for the evolution of co-
operation, natural selection favors defectors. There are at least ﬁve mechanisms
that can lead to the evolution of cooperation: kin selection, group selection, direct
reciprocity, indirect reciprocity and network reciprocity (=graph selection).
In this paper, we study the interaction between direct and network reciprocity; how-
ever, unlike conventional network reciprocity, as deﬁned in Nowak (2006b), here
the network is adaptive, as discussed below. The study of the evolution of coop-
eration under direct reciprocity on dynamical networks deserves special attention,
given the recent results which show that co-evolution of population structure with
individual strategy provide efﬁcient mechanism for the evolution of cooperation
under simple one-shot games (Pacheco et al., 2006a,b; Santos et al., 2006d).
Direct reciprocity is based on the idea of repeated encounters between two indi-
viduals (Trivers, 1971) according to the principle, ”I scratch your back and you
scratch mine”. The game theoretic framework of direct reciprocity is the repeated
Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), which has been the subject of numerous studies across
various disciplines (Rapoport and Chammah, 1965; Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981;
Axelrod, 1984; Selten and Hammerstein, 1984; Milinski, 1987; May, 1987; Ax-
elrod and Dion, 1988; Fudenberg and Maskin, 1990; Imhof et al., 2005). A large
number of strategies for playing the repeated PD have been analyzed. The most
prominent ones are tit-for-tat (Axelrod, 1984), generous-tit-for-tat (Nowak and Sig-
mund, 1992), contrite-tit-for-tat (Sugden, 1986; Boerlijst, 1997) or win-stay, lose-
shift (Nowak and Sigmund, 1993).
2In general, it is a very difﬁcult task to ﬁnd successful strategies for playing the
repeated PD (Axelrod, 1984; Kraines and Kraines, 1988; Fudenberg and Maskin,
1990; Lindgren, 1991). But if what we want is to investigate if cooperation has any
chance to evolve by direct reciprocity at all, then a very simple game can be studied.
We only need to consider two strategies: Unconditional defectors (D), defect all the
time; Reciprocators (R) start cooperating and then continue to cooperate as long as
the opponent cooperates, but defect if the opponent defects. Such individuals can
be thought of as playing a strategy like tit-for-tat or Grim. Tit-for-tat cooperates on
the ﬁrst move and then does whatever the opponent has done on the previous move.
Grim cooperates until the opponent defects once and then permanently switches
to defection. Despite the difference between these two strategies, when playing
against an unconditional defector, tit-for-tat and grim lead to the same sequence
of cooperation in the ﬁrst round and unconditional defection from then on. Only
if errors or more complex strategy sets are considered, differences between the
strategies arise. Hence, a Reciprocator will only cooperate once against a defector
and will behave as an unconditional cooperator against another Reciprocator.
Let us denote by w the probability of playing another round. The average number
of rounds between the same two players is given by 1/(1 − w). The payoff matrix
for reciprocators (R) versus unconditional defectors (D) is given by



R D
R
b − c
1 − w
−c
D b 0


 (1)
that is, reciprocators pay the cost c once, and unconditional defectors receive the
beneﬁt b only once.
One-shot and repeated games on spatial lattices have been studied by many authors
(Nowak and May, 1992, 1993; Wilson et al., 1992; Nowak et al., 1994; Lindgren
and Nordahl, 1994; Killingback and Doebeli, 1996; Nakamaru et al., 1997, 1998;
van Baalen and Rand, 1998; Szab´ o and T˝ oke, 1998; Hauert et al., 2002; Szab´ o
and Hauert, 2002; Brandt et al. , 2003; Hauert and Doebeli, 2004; Hauert and
Szab´ o, 2005; Szab´ o et al., 2005; Nowak, 2006a; Szab´ o and F´ ath, 2007). Evolu-
tionary graph theory is an extension of this approach to general population struc-
ture and networks (Lieberman et al., 2005; Pacheco and Santos, 2005; Santos and
Pacheco, 2005; Santos et al., 2005, 2006a,b; Santos and Pacheco, 2006; Ohtsuki
and Nowak, 2006a,b, 2007; Ohtsuki et al., 2006, 2007a,b; Pacheco et al., 2006a,b).
It is usually assumed that the population structure is constant in the time scale of the
evolutionary updating. Recently, Ohtsuki and Nowak (2007) have investigated the
evolutionary feasibility of cooperation under direct reciprocity for static networks.
The combination of direct reciprocity with (static) network reciprocity was shown
to open the way for reciprocators to invade (even when rare) unconditional defec-
tors, which is never possible in a well-mixed population. The effect of network
3reciprocity is strongest if people have few neighbors (or if most interactions occur
only with a subset of ‘very close friends’). In many real-world social and biological
networks (Amaral et al., 2000; Dorogovtsev and Mendes, 2003; May, 2006; Santos
et al., 2006d), however, the average connectivity of individuals is not small.
In addition to static networks, one-shot-games on dynamical graphs have also been
investigated (Bala and Goyal, 2000; Skyrms and Pemantle, 2000; Zimmermann et
al., 2004; Egu´ ıluz et al., 2005; Santos et al., 2006d). It has been recently shown
(Pacheco et al., 2006a,b; Santos et al., 2006d) that the limitation to small connec-
tivity may be overcome if one evolves simultaneously individual strategy and pop-
ulation structure. Here we investigate the impact of co-evolution of strategy and
structure in the evolution of cooperation under direct reciprocity.
InSection2weintroducerelevantconceptsofevolutionary gamedynamicsinﬁnite
andinﬁnitepopulations,aswellasresultsrelatedtodirectreciprocityinwell-mixed
populations. In Section 3 we introduce the model of active linking dynamics, in
which individuals seek new partners and break existing ties at different rates. In
Sections 4 and 5 we discuss our results for direct reciprocity on dynamical graphs.
In Section 6 we offer conclusions.
2 Evolutionary stability and risk-dominance in well-mixed populations
Consider a game between two strategies, A and B, given by the payoff matrix
  A B
A pAA pAB
B pBA pBB
 
. (2)
An inﬁnitely large population of A players cannot be invaded by B players if
pAA > pBA, that is, A is both a strict Nash equilibrium and an Evolutionarily Stable
Strategy (ESS). In an inﬁnite well-mixed population, both strategies are ESS when-
ever pAA > pBA and pAB < pBB. The replicator equation (Taylor and Jonker, 1978;
Hofbauer et al., 1979; Weibull, 1995; Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998) admits an un-
stable mixed equilibrium, located at x∗ = (pBB −pAB)/(pAA−pAB −pBA+pBB),
where x∗ is the equilibrium frequency of A players in the population. Strategy A
is Risk-Dominant (RD) if it has the bigger basin of attraction, that is, whenever
pAA + pAB > pBA + pBB.
In ﬁnite, well-mixed populations, a crucial quantity is the ﬁxation probability of
a strategy, that is, the probability that the lineage arising from a single mutant of
that strategy will take over the entire population (Nowak et al., 2004; Taylor et al.,
2004). If pAA + 2pAB > pBA + 2pBB then the ﬁxation probability of strategy A is
4greaterthantheﬁxationprobability ofaneutralmutant(1/N).Thismeansselection
favors the replacement of B by A, and therefore a single A-player in a population
of B-players is an advantageous mutant. The condition can be expressed as a 1/3-
rule: if the ﬁtness of the invading A at a frequency of 1/3 is greater than the ﬁtness
of the resident B then the ﬁxation probability of A is greater than 1/N (Nowak et
al., 2004; Imhof and Nowak, 2006; Ohtsuki et al., 2007c). This condition holds in
the limit of weak selection where the payoff from the game is small compared to a
constant background ﬁtness. Furthermore, if A is ‘risk dominant’ (RD) compared
to B, then the ﬁxation probability of A is greater than the ﬁxation probability of
B for weak selection and large population size (Nowak et al., 2004; Imhof and
Nowak, 2006).
Given the payoff matrix associated with direct reciprocity, eq. (1), we can immedi-
ately write down the following conditions (Ohtsuki and Nowak, 2007):
The reciprocator strategy is an ESS if
b
c
>
1
w
. (3a)
In this case, a defector in an inﬁnitely large population of cooperators has a lower
ﬁtness. The unstable ﬁxed point is located at
x
∗ =
c
b − c
1 − w
w
. (3b)
In a ﬁnite population, however, it is still possible that the ﬁxation probability of
a single defector, ρD, is greater than that of a neutral mutant (1/N). Hence, if we
want defectors to be disadvantageous, we must require that ρD < 1/N. For weak
selection and large population size the condition reads (Ohtsuki and Nowak, 2007)
b
c
>
3 − w
2w
. (3c)
In this case, the basin of attraction of reciprocators is greater than 1/3. Reciproca-
tors become RD when
b
c
>
2 − w
w
, (3d)
that is, ρR > ρD for large populations and weak selection. Finally, reciprocators
become advantageous if ρR > 1/N; for large populations and weak selection, this
is equivalent to (Ohtsuki and Nowak, 2007)
b
c
>
3 − 2w
w
. (3e)
53 Basic model and transformation of payoff matrices
Let us study a game between two strategies, A and B, in a population of ﬁxed size,
N. There are NA players who use strategy A, and NB players who use strategy B.
3.1 Unconditional strategies in ﬁnite, well-mixed populations
First consider the case without dynamical linking or conditional strategies. Strate-
gies A and B are unconditional and pure strategies of the 2 × 2 game with payoff
matrix
  A B
A pAA pAB
B pBA pBB
 
. (4)
In each round of the game, A players choose action A, and B players choose action
B. Suppose that players keep playing the game with all other players simultane-
ously. Each A-player interacts with NA − 1 many A-opponents and NB many B-
opponents. Each B-player interacts with NA many A-opponents and NB −1 many
B-opponents. When it takes an amount of time τ0 for players to complete a round
of game, the payoffs per unit time are calculated as
WA = (NA − 1)
pAA
τ0
+ NB
pAB
τ0
,
WB = NA
pBA
τ0
+ (NB − 1)
pBB
τ0
.
(5)
If NA and NB are large, we can neglect −1 in eq.(5) and we obtain



WA
WB


 =
N
τ0



pAA pAB
pBA pBB






xA
xB


. (6)
Here xA and xB represent relative abundances of strategies, A and B, namely, xA =
NA/N, xB = NB/N, such that xA + xB = 1.
3.2 Unconditional strategies in populations with dynamical linking
Next we incorporate the effect of dynamical linking into the payoff matrix. Con-
sider two players in the population. These players are able to play games only when
there is a link between them. It is possible for a player to have multiple links and to
play games with different partners at the same time. Let φij represent the average
fraction of time a link is present between an i(= A,B)-player and a j(= A,B)-
6player. In this case, the payoffs per unit time become
WA = (NA − 1)φAA
pAA
τ0
+ NBφAB
pAB
τ0
,
WB = NAφBA
pBA
τ0
+ NBφBB
pBB
τ0
.
(7)
We have 


WA
WB


 =
N
τ0



φAApAA φABpAB
φBApBA φBBpBB






xA
xB


. (8)
Equation (8) suggests that the linking dynamics introduces a simple transformation
of the payoff matrix. We can study standard evolutionary game dynamics using the
modiﬁed payoff matrix (Pacheco et al., 2006a,b).
The fractions of time that different types of links are active, φ, are calculated as
follows. Links are formed at certain rates and have speciﬁc life-times. Denote by
X(t) the number of AA links at time t. Similarly, Y (t) and Z(t) denote the number
of AB and BB links at time t. The maximum possible number of AA, AB and BB
links is respectively given by
Xm = NA(NA − 1)/2
Ym = NANB
Zm = NB(NB − 1)/2
(9)
Suppose A and B players have a propensity to form new links denoted by αA and
αB, such that AA links are formed at a rate α2
A, AB links are formed at a rate αAαB
and BB links are formed at a rate α2
B. Also suppose that the average life-times of
links are given by τAA, τAB and τBB (≫ τ0).
Linking dynamics can then be described by a system of three ordinary differential
equations for the number of links (Pacheco et al., 2006a,b):
˙ X = α
2
A(Xm − X) −
1
τAA
X,
˙ Y = αAαB(Ym − Y ) −
1
τAB
Y,
˙ Z = α
2
B(Zm − Z) −
1
τBB
Z.
(10)
In the steady state, the number of links of the three different types is given by
X
∗ =
α2
AτAA
α2
AτAA + 1
Xm,
Y
∗ =
αAαBτAB
αAαBτAB + 1
Ym,
Z
∗ =
α2
BτBB
α2
BτBB + 1
Zm.
(11)
7Hence we may write
φAA =
X∗
Xm
=
α2
AτAA
α2
AτAA + 1
,
φAB = φBA =
Y ∗
Ym
=
αAαBτAB
αAαBτAB + 1
,
φBB =
Z∗
Zm
=
α2
BτBB
α2
BτBB + 1
.
(12)
Examples for cumulative degree distributions of population structures attained un-
der steady-state dynamics for different combinations of the relevant parameters are
shown in Figure 1. Indeed, this simple model of linking dynamics leads to single-
scale networks as deﬁned by Amaral et al. (2000), with associated cumulative de-
gree distributions exhibiting fast decaying tails (Santos et al., 2006d). Such tails
which decay exponentially or faster than exponential, leading to what are known
as ”broad-scale” and ”single-scale” networks, respectively, are features which, to-
getherwithalargevariabilityintheaverageconnectivity(DorogovtsevandMendes,
2003;May,2006),characterizemostreal-worldsocialnetworks.Thepresentmodel
only encompasses single scale networks. In order to describe the broad-scale net-
works often encountered in social systems, more reﬁned models should be devel-
oped.
The vertical arrows in Figure 1 indicate the average connectivity of the associ-
ated graphs, showing that connectivity values similar to those measured empirically
(Dorogovtsev and Mendes, 2003) are easily obtained with the present model. Note,
in particular, that the dependence of the stationary networks on the frequency of
individuals of a given type will automatically couple network dynamics with the
frequency-dependent evolutionary dynamics we introduce in the following.
3.3 Conditional strategies in populations with dynamical linking
So far we have assumed that strategies A and B are pure strategies in a single
game. What if they are strategies in a repeated game? Consider reciprocators (R)
and unconditional defectors (D). Each time a new link is established, a reciproca-
tor cooperates in the ﬁrst round while an unconditional defector never cooperates.
Once a reciprocator faces defection by the opponent, he keeps defecting until the
link is broken.
Interactions with two R players last on average for time τRR. Since it takes time τ0
to complete a round, they play on average τRR/τ0 rounds of Prisoner’s Dilemma
game within the lifetime of that link. Suppose that the payoff matrix of the single-
8round Prisoner’s Dilemma game is given by
  C D
C pCC pCD
D pDC pDD
 
. (13)
Both reciprocators gain the payoff of (τRR/τ0)×pCC in time τRR. Therefore, given
a link remains established, a payoff per unit time is given by
τRR
τ0
  pCC  
1
τRR
=
pCC
τ0
. (14)
A similar consideration yields that the payoff per unit time between two uncondi-
tional defectors is given by
τDD
τ0
  pDD  
1
τDD
=
pDD
τ0
. (15)
When a link is established between a reciprocator and a defector, the link lasts for
an average time τRD, so that these players on average play τRD/τ0 rounds of Pris-
oner’s Dilemma game. In the ﬁrst round, the reciprocator cooperates whereas the
unconditional defector defects, which yields the payoff of pCD to the reciprocator
and pDC to the defector. From the second round on, both keep defecting and gain
pDD per round. The average number of rounds of mutual defection is (τRD/τ0)−1.
Since the whole repeated game takes time τRD, the average payoff of reciprocators
per unit time is, under the assumption of the link remaining established, given by

pCD +
 τRD
τ0
− 1
 
pDD

 1
τRD
=
pDD
τ0
+
pCD − pDD
τRD
. (16)
Under the same assumption, the average payoff of defectors per unit time is given
by

pDC +
 τRD
τ0
− 1
 
pDD

 1
τRD
=
pDD
τ0
+
pDC − pDD
τRD
. (17)
Taking into account the fraction of time when links are absent, we ﬁnd that the
average payoffs per unit time of reciprocators and unconditional defectors are
WR = (NR − 1)φRR
pCC
τ0
+ NDφRD
 pDD
τ0
+
pCD − pDD
τRD
 
WD = NRφDR
 pDD
τ0
+
pDC − pDD
τRD
 
+ (ND − 1)φDD
pDD
τ0
.
(18)
9Therefore for large populations we obtain



WR
WD


 =
N
τ0

 

φRRpCC φRD
 
pDD + τ0
τRD(pCD − pDD)
 
φDR
 
pDD + τ0
τRD(pDC − pDD)
 
φDDpDD

 




xR
xD


.
(19)
In the following, we will study the payoff matrix

 

R D
R φRRpCC φRD
 
pDD + τ0
τRD(pCD − pDD)
 
D φDR
 
pDD + τ0
τRD(pDC − pDD)
 
φDDpDD

 
 (20)
as if associated with the evolutionary dynamics of a well-mixed population. Re-
member that φ’s in (20) are determined by eq.(12). In addition to the entries of the
2×2 payoff matrix, we have six parameters in total, αR,αD,τRR,τRD,τDD and τ0.
4 Results
Let us investigate how the frequencies of strategies R and D change under evolu-
tionary dynamics. The simultaneous evolution of strategy and structure will depend
on the time scales associated with strategy evolution (T) and structural evolution
(τij) (Pacheco et al., 2006a; Santos et al., 2006d; Pacheco et al., 2006b). Whenever
T ≪ τij strategies evolve in an immutable network, which leads to the framework
investigated by Ohtsuki and Nowak (2007). Whenever T ≫ τij graph dynamics
always attains a steady state before the next strategy update takes place. This limit,
which has been shown to extend to a range of time scales which is wider than
expected (Santos et al., 2006d; Pacheco et al., 2006b), is the novel one we shall
investigate here. In the following, we always assume that τ0 ≪ τij ≪ T holds.
Figure 2 illustrates the magnitudes of the different time scales that appear in the
present paper.
Let us study a standard Prisoner’s Dilemma game
  C D
C pCC pCD
D pDC pDD
 
=
  C D
C b − c −c
D b 0
 
(21)
(in the appendix we provide the general conditions for the case in which pDD  = 0).
Suppose, for simplicity, that both reciprocators and unconditional defectors share
the same propensity, α ≡ αR = αD, to form a new link. The matrix (20) simpliﬁes
10to

 

R D
R
τRR
τRR + α−2(b − c)
τ0
τRD + α−2(−c)
D
τ0
τRD + α−2b 0

 
 . (22)
Multiplying (22) by (τRD + α−2)/τ0 gives us
  R D
R se(b − c) −c
D b 0
 
, (23)
where
se =
τRR
τ0
 
1 + τRDα2
1 + τRRα2. (24)
5 Discussion
As seen in (23) (compare with eq.(1)), the parameter se represents the effective
number of rounds of mutual cooperation. The larger the value of se the easier it is
for reciprocators to invade the entire population under active linking. For ﬁxed α,
τ0 and τRD, se is an increasing function of τRR, which conveys the message that the
more long-lived the links are between reciprocators, the better for cooperation. On
the other hand, for ﬁxed α, τ0 and τRR, se is also an increasing function of τRD. In
other words, the longer the lifetime of links between reciprocators and defectors,
the better for cooperation. This result seems counter-intuitive. However, one may
understand it if one considers the type of interaction on this link in detail. Once
a RD link is established, the reciprocator obtains the sucker’s payoff −c once.
After that, both individuals receive nothing. For the reciprocator, it is better to keep
this link active than breaking it, since otherwise the link might be reestablished
again and the defector would exploit him once more. Thus, for reciprocators a long
lifetime of links is advantageous. If it is a RR link, the mutual cooperation leads
to a higher payoff. An active RD link avoids multiple acts of exploitation by the
defector.
We now study how se behaves with α. When the propensity to form a new link, α,
is very small, se becomes
se ≈
τRR
τ0
, (25)
which is exactly the same as the average number of rounds played by two recipro-
cators. On the other hand, when α is very large we obtain
se ≈
τRD
τ0
, (26)
11which is the average number of rounds played between a reciprocator and an un-
conditional defector. The feasibility of cooperation relies on the propensity to form
new links. When this value is high, se is determined by the lifetime of reciprocator-
defector links. Since it is often the case in reality that τRR > τRD, we ﬁnd that the
smaller the propensity to establish new links the better for cooperation, given that
τRR contributes more to se than τRD. Indeed, when the propensity to form a new
link is high, defectors, who tend to lose a link more frequently than reciprocators,
are able to reestablish the link quickly and exploit a reciprocator in a ‘new’ ﬁrst
round, which is unfavourable for cooperation.
When we write se in terms of the effective discounting factor, we
se =
1
1 − we
or we = 1 −
1
se
, (27)
all the results from eq.(3a) to eq.(3e) hold for w = we, provided the population size
N is large such that the underlying mean-ﬁeld treatment used here remains valid.
For example, the reciprocating strategy is an ESS against unconditional defection
whenever
b
c
>
1
we
=
se
se − 1
(28)
holds.
In this work we took into account the time scale associated with a single round of
a repeated game, as well as the lifetimes of different types of links, together with
the possibility that existing links are severed and new links are established. As a
result, and in the limit in which link dynamics is faster than evolutionary dynamics
of strategies, we have obtained a game-theoretical problem equivalent to a conven-
tional evolutionary game in a well-mixed population, with a rescaled payoff matrix.
This equivalence, however, is only mathematical, in the sense that the problem un-
der consideration does not allow us to regain a well-mixed population limit easily.
Clearly, the model introduced here captures some of the stylized features of social
networks, in which individuals change their social ties in time, and in which re-
warding links tend to last longer than unpleasant ones. On the other hand, one may
expect that random rewiring does not capture the detailed mechanism(s) underly-
ing social network dynamics (Santos et al., 2006d). While the present model allows
one to assess the role of dynamic linking in the evolution of cooperation under di-
rect reciprocity, more elaborate models should be considered in order to describe
realistic social dynamics.
Our model shows that, in what concerns the evolution of cooperation under direct
reciprocity, the path to cooperation is facilitated by active linking dynamics. Coop-
eration is most viable when links last long enough and the propensity to form new
links is not too high. Certainly this model recovers the message already obtained
before that sparse static graphs favor cooperation (Ohtsuki and Nowak, 2007). Yet,
dynamic linking enlarges the scope of feasibility of cooperation.
126 Conclusions
Whenever single round interactions of a Prisoner’s Dilemma game are swift, and
the readjustment of different types of links occurs much faster than the readjust-
ment of strategies, we ﬁnd that the role of link rewiring dynamics is to introduce
a rescaling of the payoff matrix associated with direct reciprocity. The rescaling
obtained widens the scope of feasibility of cooperation already set forward by Oht-
suki and Nowak (2007). Without dynamical linking, reciprocators mutually coop-
erate in consecutive rounds in a repeated game, whereas unconditional cooperators
take advantage of exploiting reciprocators only in the ﬁrst round. In the traditional
framework of studying the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game, one usually assumes
that the number of repeated games that one plays is the same among individuals in
the population, and so is the number of the ﬁrst round of repeated games. When ac-
tive rewiring and time scales are explicitly taken into consideration, however, this
homogeneous assumption is lost, and one must take into consideration the com-
petition between the lifetime of reciprocator-reciprocator links and reciprocator-
defector links and the the rates of link formation. As shown in Fig. 1, parameter
values which ensure the feasibility of cooperation under active linking dynamics
lead also to social graphs exhibiting realistic features. Active linking opens a way
for cooperation by direct reciprocity to evolve on these realistic networks.
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17APPENDIX
For the general case in which pDD  = 0, eq.(23) now reads
  R D
R sepCC ηpDD + (pCD − pDD)
D ηpDD + (pDC − pDD) repDD
 
(A.1)
where se has been deﬁned before, re =
τDD
τ0
 
1 + τRDα2
1 + τDDα2, and η = τRD/τ0.
ForthePrisoner’sDilemma weknowthatpDC > pCC > pDD > pCD.Hence,direct
reciprocityandactivelinkingmayeffectivelyleadtoacoordinationgamewhenever
sepCC > ηpDD + (pDC − pDD) (A.2)
and
repDD > ηpDD + (pCD − pDD). (A.3)
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Figure 1.
Cumulative degree distributions (deﬁned as D(k) =
 
j≥k Nj/N, with Nj the num-
ber of nodes with degree j) for networks generated with the present model, for pop-
ulations of size N = 103 and two different types of individuals. The fast decaying
tails correlate well with the observed tails of real social networks (Amaral et al.,
2000; Dorogovtsev and Mendes, 2003; May, 2006). The present model, however,
leads to single scale networks (Amaral et al., 2000), broad scale networks being out
of its scope (for details of the degree distributions, see (Pacheco et al., 2006a). On
the other hand, the dependence of the ﬁnal network on the frequency of each type of
individuals leads to a natural coupling between network dynamics and frequency-
dependent strategy evolution. The vertical arrows indicate the average connectivity
of each graph, which is far greater than those typically associated with static graphs
where cooperation under direct reciprocity thrives (Ohtsuki and Nowak, 2007). Pa-
rameters used: NA/N = 0.5, αA = αB = 1, βAA = βAB = βBB = 50 (red solid
curve), NA/N = 0.35, αA = 1.1, αB = 0.75, βAA = βAB = βBB = 50 (blue
dashed curve) and NA/N = 0.5, αA = αB = 0.2, βAA = βAB = βBB = 10 (black
dash-dot curve).
Figure 2.
Characteristic time scales associated with direct reciprocity under active linking
dynamics. We assume that a typical interaction between two individuals has an av-
erage duration τ0. For direct reciprocity to be effective, the characteristic duration
of links between reciprocators (τRR), between defectors (τDD) and between recip-
rocators and defectors (τRD) should be larger than τ0. Nonetheless, each of this
type of links may have different characteristic lifetimes, as illustrated in the left
panel. Thus, the average number of rounds between pairs of individuals with dif-
ferent strategies may be different, as well as the average number of links between
individuals of different types, as illustrated in the right panel. Finally, our analytical
results rely on the assumption that the characteristic time scale of active linking -
of the order of any of {τRR,τRD,τDD} - must be much smaller than that associated
with strategy evolution (T), as illustrated in the left panel.
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